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Abstract
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are increasingly playing a central role in shaping policy for
development. By comparison, social experimentation has not driven the great transformation of
welfare within the developed world. This introduces a range of issues for those interested in the
nature of research evidence for making policy. In this article we will seek a greater understanding
of why the RCT is increasingly seen as the ‘gold standard’ for policy experiments in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs), but not in the more advanced liberal democracies, and we will
explore the implications of this. One objection to the use of RCTs, however can be cost, but
implementing policies and programmes without good evidence or a good understanding of their
effectiveness is unlikely to be a good use of resources either. Other issues arise. Trials are often
complex to run and ethical concerns often arise in social ‘experiments’ with human subjects.
However, rolling out untested policies may also be morally objectionable. This article sheds new
light on the relationship between evidence and evaluation in public policy in both the global north
and developing south. It also tackles emerging issues concerning the ‘use’ and ‘misuse’ of evidence
and evaluation within public policy.
Keywords
Social research; Evidence-based policy; International comparisons; Knowledge utilization;
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Introduction
We can achieve a sort of control under which the controlled, though they
are following a code much more scrupulously than was ever the case
under the old system, nevertheless feel free. They are doing what they
want to do, not what they are forced to do. That’s the source of the
tremendous power of positive reinforcement – there’s no restraint and
no revolt. By careful cultural design, we control not the final behaviour,
but the inclination to behave – the motives, desires, the wishes. (Skinner
: –)
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Many observers have commented on the spread of behavioural experiments
in global policy. This new and emerging form of public policy often involves
conditioning the receipt of welfare – in the form of cash transfers, goods or
services – according to specific individual behaviour. Few however, have
touched on the contextual differences in terms of the application of research
and evidence governing policy, especially social assistance in the developing
world and social security within the developed world. Subsequently, the
debates on the progress of public policy in the global north and south are not
as well connected as they might be.
In LMICs, social experiments with conditionality are part of the drive for
evidence-based policy (Fiszbein et al. 		). Conditional cash transfer (CCT)
programmes usually have an a priori evaluation design built into their
operation, that embraces experimental or quasi-experimental features and
RCT designs, for example. By contrast, in the advanced liberal democracies,
there has been less direct appeal to research evidence gained using from
robust evaluation in order to secure major welfare reform: experimentation
and evaluation with RCTs has been less of a priority. Consequently, welfare
states were reformed on ideological grounds, with an appeal to political theory
as Mead and Beem (		
) observe. Putting this in stark terms, welfare condi-
tionality in the south is, arguably, being driven by an evidence-based policy-
making agenda, whereas in the north, political philosophy is clearly driving
welfare reform. This article seeks to shed new light on the relationship
between evidence and evaluation within the different worldly contexts, by
drawing out emerging arguments and counter-arguments about the ‘use’ and
‘misuse’ of evidence within public policy. The article is organized as follows:
the first section examines the increase and nature of evidence-based policy for
development; the second section considers how welfare policy has been trans-
formed in the developed world; followed by a more detailed examination of
some of the controversies in section three. Lastly, reflections and conclusions
are drawn together in the fourth section.
Public Policy for Development: The Rise of
Behavioural Economics
In the brave new world of the behavioural economist, achieving the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) for health and well-being is ultimately
about demonstrably changing people’s behaviour for the better. Being able to
demonstrate the effectiveness or impact of an intervention is thus the keystone
for policy development. As a result of the global research effort, it is now well
established that there are certain (desirable) human behaviour and conditions
of living that are beneficial for our health and well-being that, arguably,
should form the basis for public policy (Dean 		). This point, implicit in the
literature, certainly needs to be made more explicit, as biomedical and social
research continues to establish food and dietary requirements for good health,
education, housing and living standards, along with certain behaviour and
practices that reduce the risk of ill-health and disease (e.g. WHO 		). For far
too long, the criticism has been that acceptance of incontrovertible evidence
into functioning policy has been slow, partial and unsystematic; resulting in
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health deficits, waste of human potential and other associated costs to society
(WHO 	). The second point, about clearly demonstrating success and
impact in social policy addresses the need for robust evaluation. In order to
consider the effectiveness of a particular policy or programme, one really
needs to know what outcomes would have been achieved had the programme
not been in place. This is often referred to as the ‘counterfactual outcome’
(OECD n.d.). One way of overcoming this evaluation problem is through the
use of RCTs, which are considered to be the ‘gold standard’ of all the methods
available to researchers (Young et al. 		). In the trials, participants are
usually randomly assigned to intervention or control groups (Sibbald and
Roland ), researchers then compare the outcomes between groups (see
figure ). A systematic review of RCT results can usually be found at the very
pinnacle of the research evidence hierarchy of (figure ), as it provides a way
of pooling evidence from different studies to provide an overview of outcomes
(White and Waddington 	).1
It may not be surprising, therefore, to find an influential group of econo-
mists advocating social experiments and in particular RCTs, as the main tool
for studying the effectiveness of policy in development settings. In a recent
trial in Malawi, for example, poor families were given cash on the condition
that they send their children to school (Baird et al. 			a, 			b). Some
villages were randomly assigned to the social assistance programme and
others were not (figure ). Importantly, at the outset, each village had the same
Figure 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the most rigorous way of determining whether a 
cause-effect relation exists between treatment and outcome and for assessing the cost 
effectiveness of a treatment. They have several important features: 
• Random allocation to intervention and control groups. 
• Participants and trialists should remain unaware of which treatment was given until 
the study is completed (although such double blind studies are not always feasible or 
appropriate). 
• All groups are treated identically except for the experimental treatment or 
intervention. 
• The analysis is focused on estimating the size of the difference in predefined 
outcomes between intervention and control groups.
 
Other study designs, including non-randomized controlled trials, can detect associations 
between an intervention and an outcome. But they cannot rule out the possibility that the 
association was caused by a third factor linked to both intervention and outcome. Random 
allocation ensures no systematic differences between intervention groups in factors, known 
and unknown, that may affect outcome. 
Source: adapted from Sibbald and Roland : 	.
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equal chance of being picked to receive the intervention; families were not told
that they were part of an experiment, they were ‘blind’ or ‘blinded’: knowing
this may affect their behaviour and the outcome of the study. The develop-
ment economists – sometimes referred to as the ‘randomistas’ – argue that this
type of randomized experiment is the only sure way of identifying impact,
because it helps to eliminate bias and other confounding (hidden) factors.
Other non-experimental methods found at the bottom of the evidence hier-
archy are largely dismissed as they are considered unscientific and are best
avoided (figure ). The influence of the randomistas appears to be growing;
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization), philanthropic agencies and
donors (e.g. DFID 	b) are increasingly giving (explicit) preference to ran-
domized designs and systematic reviews in evaluating public policy pro-
grammes and their impacts (Hickey et al. 		; Hagen-Zanker et al. 	).
Figure 
Hierarchies of research evidence
Source: adapted from Davies et al. 			: .
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According to behavioural economists like Banerjee and Duflo (	), the
major debates in international development can be boiled down to disagree-
ments about the shape of a function in development theory (figure ). The
S-shaped curve on the left suggests poor people are ‘trapped’ in poverty and
require a ‘conditional push’ to get out of their own poverty. The L-shaped
curve on the other hand, suggests that poor people are gradually able to pull
themselves out of poverty because they are not really ‘trapped’ at all. If we
accept the premise of the development economist, the theoretical proposition
Figure 
Malawi RCT design
Source: Baird et al. 		a: .
Figure 
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.
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and corresponding debate about which of the two graphs best represents the
real world can only be settled experimentally, through the use of RCTs. Of
course, not all social researchers agree with the world view depicted in these
two charts or see the need for social experiments to solve the problem of global
poverty. The randomistas, however, firmly believe that it is perfectly possible
to make significant progress in tackling global social problems using experi-
mentation; through the accumulation of small experimental steps, each well
thought out, carefully tested and judiciously implemented. In effect, they
claim to be saving lives with a well-placed behavioural ‘nudge’ and they offer
plenty of evidence to support their position.
Saving lives with a well-placed nudge
Conditional social policy programmes are now firmly established across the
developing world and shape the lives of millions of people. Many CCT
programmes are large-scale and usually have an evaluation design built into
their operation. Oportunidades in Mexico for example, covers about a quarter of
Mexico’s national population (.
 million households). In Brazil, some 
million families –  million people – receive regular transfers under the Bolsa
Família programme. Mexico’s Progresa (renamed Oportunidades in 		), often
seen as the seminal and model programme, began in . This programme
has demonstrated a range of benefits over the years, particularly in the areas
of health and education (DFID 		). For instance, some 	 per cent of
families participating in the scheme have shown improved nutritional status
and stunting has been reduced; ante-natal care increased by  per cent,
contributing to a 
 per cent drop in the incidence of illness in newborns;
immunization rates improved as a result of preventive healthcare appoint-
ments; and school enrolment rates increased by over 	 per cent for girls and
by 	 per cent for boys. These social assistance programmes also have fiscal
appeal, at least according to national governments and NGOs such as the
World Bank. In terms of national budget, Mexico and Brazil commit only 	.

per cent of gross domestic product to their programmes. With the evidence-
base for CCT programmes growing, Guatemala is one of the latest Latin
American countries to embark on reform with Mi Familia Progresa (my family
is moving forward), introduced in 		 (Gaia 		). In lower-income contexts,
especially in Africa, CCT programmes and experiments are often on a smaller
scale – as well as familiar conditions relating to school attendance and the use
of health services, other conditions continue to be tested, for example adult
education, micro-credit, housing and accommodation schemes, also bed net
schemes to help protect people against malaria-carrying mosquitoes (DFID
	a).
The evidence suggests CCT programmes can be particularly effective in
promoting health and education services in LMICs (Lagarde et al. 		).
Improvements in the use of health services (table ) is particularly striking as
the effects are concentrated among families who are least likely to use the
services in the absence of conditional reward. School enrolment rates also
show significant gains with conditionality in place (table ). In addition, there
are demonstrable impacts on family food consumption. Table  shows signifi-
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cant increases in daily per capita food consumption: up by  per cent in
Brazil,  per cent in Colombia and over 	 per cent in Nicaragua. Families in
the intervention group also tend to spend significantly more on food, indicated
by the findings on food budgets. For example, household food expenditures as
a proportion of total household budgets increased by  percentage points
among programme beneficiaries in Columbia, Ecuador and Nicaragua
(table ). Lastly, CCT programmes have secured significant reductions in
levels of extreme poverty (table ). In Mexico, for instance, severe poverty as
measured by the ‘squared poverty gap’, which attempts to take account of the
depth of poverty and inequality among poor people, has fallen by about  per
cent. Systematic reviews continually look to refine and improve the effective-
ness of CCT programmes (Gaarder et al. 		; Yoong et al. 	).2 Despite the
huge investments in large-scale trials, important questions remain unan-
swered, particularly concerning cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit, an issue to
which we return below. Before this, however, we turn to consider the trans-
formation of social policy in the advanced economies, where concerns about
the paucity of evidence and robust evaluation continue to be raised.
Welfare Transformed: ‘Workfare’ States in the
Developed World
The neo-liberal foundations of the welfare state can be traced back to the
postwar period, particularly in the USA. The 	s, however, witnessed the
full expression of this collective form of thinking. Mead and Beem (		
), for
example, observe that major welfare reforms were undertaken in the
advanced liberal democracies on ideological grounds, with an appeal to free-
market political philosophy. Active labour market policies (ALMP), which
Table 
Poverty measures for number of people (in millions) below $.
 a day in 		
 purchasing
power parities
Country Headcount Poverty gapa Squared poverty gapb
Pre-transfer Post-transfer Pre-transfer Post-transfer Pre-transfer Post-transfer
Brazil 	. 	. 	.		 	.		 	.	

 	.	
Ecuador 	. 	. 	.		 	.		 	.	 	.	

Jamaica 	. 	. 	.	
 	.		 	.	
 	.	
Mexico 	.	 	. 	.	 	.	 	.	 	.	
Source: Fiszbein et al. 		: 	.
Notes: a = depth of poverty: this provides information regarding how far off households are
from the poverty line; b = poverty severity: this takes into account not only the distance
separating the poor from the poverty line (the poverty gap), but also the inequality among the
poor. Thus, a higher weight is placed on those households who are further away from the
poverty line.
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have a tradition in the Nordic countries, were introduced into the liberal
market economies with new duties (roles) and obligations (responsibilities)
impressed on welfare benefit claimants. ‘Workfare’ (work-for-your-welfare)
regulatory policies first appeared in the USA, thereafter work-based welfare
reforms spread rapidly across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries (Nativel 		). Notions of reciprocal
obligation became firmly embedded in the various ‘welfare-to-work’ and
‘activation’ programmes. ‘Activation’ policy attempts to mobilize and enforce
paid labour; work not only pays better than welfare, it is claimed, but also
promotes well-being for individuals and nation states. Consequently, labour
market conditionality now applies to most sections of the adult working age
population across the developed world (Jacobsson and Noaksson 		).
Currently, the primary obligation on social security recipients in most
‘workfare’ states is to actively look for paid employment, and in order to
improve their chances, claimants must undergo training to develop new skills;
they must engage with the employment services on offer for their own benefit.
The original research that underpinned ‘welfare-to-work’ in the UK was
encouraging, but certainly not convincing (Vincent et al. ).3 The new
‘workfare’ policy, however, was designed to solve a problem about the effects
of passive, rights-and-eligibilities-based welfare that arose, it was argued,
because too many citizens had been reduced to ‘welfare dependency’. Sup-
porters of ‘activation’ argue the new duties impressed on welfare benefit
claimants are perfectly justifiable as the social contribution now owed by
citizens to society (Mead ). There is thus a strong ideological basis to
‘activation’ that sits squarely within the free-market neo-liberal paradigm.
However, the research evidence supporting this great transformation of social
policy has been the subject of much debate.
Fragmentary evidence
Observers complain that research has not been driving welfare reform in the
developed world in the way that it should (Haynes et al. 	; Roberts et al.
	). Aside from health, and possibly education (Oakley 			), there appears
a real lack of substantive investment in robust policy trials and systematic
reviews. Research is only now beginning to piece together the fragmentary
evidence relating to ‘activation’ in a systematic way (e.g. Kluve 		; Marcia
et al. 	). The evidence from trials to date suggests only modest returns on
certain activation programmes from unknown costs; notably, those that
include job search activities accompanied by sanctions for non-compliance.
However, the picture is as yet far from conclusive and findings may not be
generalizable from one context to another (Dorsett et al. 	; Hendra et al.
	). Clearly ‘welfare-to-work’ programmes may have some obvious benefits
as Lane et al. (	) observe, providing tailored help and support to people who
are looking for work, for instance. However, there may be structural concerns
and policy limits. The present lack of employment opportunities is one (Dean
	), child care costs are another (Davey and Hirsch 	).
Until recently, ‘welfare-to-work’ evaluations have been rather limited in
scope and design, particularly when considered against the large-scale trials in
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LMICs. Behavioural effects in the field of ‘activation’ are notoriously
complex, difficult to observe and a challenge to monitor, particularly over
time (Paz-Fuchs 		). Often, there are indirect social and economic effects,
unobserved consequences and population effects. Much of the evidence that
has been generated seems patchy at best, meaning it is often inconclusive on
key questions. For example, cost-benefit calculations are largely absent.
‘Welfare-to-work’ schemes in the UK have not delivered results, thus offering
poor value to the British taxpayer (NAO 	a). In some areas, ‘activation’
jobs are estimated to cost the public purse over £		,			 per new post (NAO
	b). Subsequently, scandals make headlines in the British press and there
have been high profile resignations amid allegations of fraud, excessive pay
and bonuses for those charged with helping unemployed people back into
paid work (Committee of Public Accounts 	). Public confidence in the
institutions may be shaken, but there may be popular support for many of the
principles at stake here (discussed in the final section). Of course, politicians
and policymakers are often keen to promote their policies and reforms. Thus,
apparent and favourable impacts – improvements in employment rates or
reductions in state expenditures, for instance – are seized upon to build public
confidence and support. However, such information is usually uncontrolled
knowledge. In other words, more often than not we know very little about the
counterfactual outcome that would have been achieved had the programme
not been in place.
Arguments Concerning the ‘Use’ and ‘Misuse’ of Evidence
and Evaluation
The review of global social policy, albeit brief, highlights a number of com-
peting tensions and complex interrelated issues for thinking about the ‘use’
and ‘misuse’ of evidence and evaluation in policy-making that require further
elaboration: these concern the nature of ‘evidence’; methodological and
ethical issues; public attitudes and the nature of the policy process.
Evidence
There is currently much debate over the nature and strength of the evidence
emerging from CCTs. The evidence from LMICs, even for improvements on
core programme objectives such as school attendance, is often unclear and
context dependant, making it hard to generalize from one experiment to the
next (Olken et al. 	). Moreover, social interventions are often characterized
by heterogeneity, delivered by different individuals operating in different
social and geographical contexts. One implication of this heterogeneity is that
average treatment and intervention effects, which are often the focus of
attention, can be less useful than estimates of differential impacts across
contexts (Plewis 		). Increasingly, statistical models, and hierarchical
models, are being used for estimating complex heterogeneity and different
variances in the intervention and control groups; and this trend in modeling
experimental and non-experimental social survey data is likely to continue
(Byrne 	).4
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In the review we also find that evidence is weak or unproven in key areas
of development, particularly for policies addressing child poverty (Yeates
		) and child labour (Tabatabai 		). Doubts are also expressed about the
longer-term sustainability of programme benefits. Impacts tend to be evalu-
ated in the short term and, as a consequence, little is known about longer-term
effects. Observed benefits may be diluted over time. For example, evaluations
tend to show the frailty of poverty reduction programmes (Lomelí 		); jobs
created by ‘activation’ programmes may not last (Kluve 		). Structural
issues extend far beyond individual agency and personal responsibility, as
Wright (	) observes. In times of high unemployment, for instance, there
simply may not be enough jobs to go around (OECD 	).
In addition, there are more fundamental, outright rejections of current
neo-liberal policy prescriptions, which also appeal directly to the research
evidence. ‘Washington Consensus’ policies, it is argued, are failing to make a
real impact on chronic global poverty and deprivation (Townsend 		;
Anand et al. 		). Extreme world poverty has fallen (Chen and Ravallion
	), down from . billion people in  to . billion people in 		
(figure 
). However, nearly all of the poverty reduction during the period took
place in China. Progress elsewhere, over nearly three decades, has been
stubbornly slow, casting a long shadow of doubt over the ‘evidence-base’
supporting the present global policy response to poverty and deprivation
Figure 

Estimates of chronic global povertya
Source: Chen and Ravallion 	: 
.
Note: a = number of people living below $.
 a day in 		
 purchasing power parities.
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(CSDH 		). By contrast, a broad coalition of bodies under the United
Nations recommends a global social protection floor to tackle the problem of
chronic global poverty (ILO 	), which would provide support to those not
covered by adequate social security (four out of five people worldwide), for
unconditional cash transfers are also effective and deliver many benefits for poor
families. In Somalia, for example, the provision of cash grants to women not
only improved food consumption levels and the use of health services, but also
helped poor families to reduce their debts (Ali et al. 		
). Other countries,
including India, are now beginning to trial and evaluate unconditional trans-
fers; soon we may be able to assemble reliable comparative data to uncover
the benefits of these schemes (Standing 	).
Evaluations
Social experiments in this field are often complex in design (Samson et al.
		). Problems over administration and coordination occur, including poor
targeting, and the costs involved in conducting an evaluation can be substan-
tial (Lomelí 		). Even in well designed trials there are a range of method-
ological issues to consider, such as bias in the results. For example, researchers
have recently detected a possible ‘Hawthorne effect’ in some of the trial data
from Latin America (de Brauw and Hoddinott 	). This implies that some
of the observed changes in behaviour during the course of a study may be
related, at least in part, to the special conditions and monitoring systems in
place during the period of investigation.
Despite the vast range of evaluations and RCTs, calculations of cost-benefit
in this field are rare (St. Clair 		). This makes it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to make clearly informed judgements about value for money, as
Barrientos (		) argues. The impact of conditionality is usually measured at
the margins, by incremental gains. For example, secondary school enrolment
rates for girls in Mexico’s Oportunidades programme increased by  percentage
points in two years, from a base of  per cent. Whether such modest gains are
worth the costs is another matter, estimated at  per cent of the total social
security programme budget in this case. Ideally, the overall (system) costs and
benefits to individuals, families and society should be reflected in the evalua-
tion. However, capturing the full range of information required is method-
ologically and technologically challenging, which itself comes at a cost.
Conditionalities may, for example, impose non-trivial compliance costs on
beneficiaries, which are not accounted for in their benefit levels. Condition-
ality imposes system costs as well as cost to individuals and families, although
it is hard to know whether these costs are outweighed by the benefits, and if
so, by how much. Including cost-benefit analysis in future evaluations would
certainly help to inform the current debate. There is a compelling argument
that unconditional transfers are cheaper, more efficient to administer and
produce similar population benefits as previously discussed.
Rights
Critics argue that social policy is being eroded by this newer neo-liberal brand
advocated by the behaviour economists (e.g. Standing 	). The issue at stake
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here is less about the ‘evidence-base’ – as we saw above, conditionality can be
effective in changing behaviour in certain circumstances. The problem,
according to some observers, is that conditionality undermines people’s rights,
citizenship and important principles governing social solidarity. CCTs are
thus divisive, in that they create and sustain social divisions within society.
Poor people are treated differently from other fellow citizens and this has
major implications, for their basic human rights may be violated. Several
international instruments affirm that every human being has the right to social
security. For example, Article  of the  UN Universal Declaration on
Human Rights (reconfirmed in  and ) states that ‘everyone, as a
member of society, has the right to social security’ and Article 
 states that
‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for their health and
wellbeing’. If social security is only transferred on condition, then basic
human rights are surely undermined. There are counter-arguments to this
position, however, whereby exponents claim that conditionality represents an
instrument of policy that, in practice, confronts the denial of basic human
rights by ensuring that welfare reaches families most in need (see Lomelí
		).
Power
Critics claim that conditionality in public policy reinforces entrenched
inequalities within and between societies, and thus preserves existing
social structures and power relations (e.g. Mcdonald and Marston 		
;
Veit-Wilson 		). This discourse attempts to move us on from fairly con-
strained debates about the ‘evidence-base’ of policy to much more basic
concerns regarding the legitimacy of current policy programmes, and the
ongoing power struggles between the dominant elites and the dominated
poor. Thus, many policymakers seem to believe that poor people must be
threatened with less money to incentivize them to follow predefined behav-
iour patterns, but this form of practice constitutes poor people as subjects
engaged in a power struggle for resources, recognition and respect. Subse-
quently, we need to be much more critical about how ‘social problems’ are
defined, as Bacchi (		) argues, and the ways in which research ‘evidence’ is
represented for policy-making.
Ethics
RCTs (as a method of evaluation) can raise profound ethical issues. RCTs
involving conditionality (i.e. policy intervention) raise even more concerns
because they antagonize people in two distinct camps. Critics of RCTs, for
example, argue that it is unfair to experiment with the lives of poor vulnerable
and disadvantaged people (Elizabeth and Larner 		). Experiments with
social security and assistance – by their very nature – often target the most
vulnerable sections of society. Therefore, critics claim that conditionality
undermines social inclusion or, worse still, reinforces existing prejudices in the
community. Unemployed people are often stigmatized in the British media,
for instance (e.g. Walters 	). For this reason, the Roman Catholic Church
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in Australia principally opposes the inclusion of Indigenous families in Aus-
tralia’s new income management scheme (Quinlan 		). In this programme,
a range of benefits including unemployment, disability and single parenting
payments, are granted on condition that recipients do not spend their money
on goods such as alcohol, tobacco, pornography or gambling products
(FaHCSIA 		). The programme involves elaborate systems for monitoring
compliance and controlling behaviour which, in some senses, seeks to attract
a degree of social acceptability. Ethically, however, the scheme has been the
subject of much controversy. In many ways, the key question turns on what
counts as ‘evidence’, and to whom – and the extent to which – we can include
notions of ‘social justice’ and ‘human rights’ in the framework of RCTs and
evaluation. Ultimately, the design of welfare policy invokes our values and the
values and attitudes of our fellow citizens, which may conflict and contrast in
sophisticated ways.
Public attitudes
Whilst implementing welfare reforms with little or no clear evidence of their
effectiveness may offend those interested in evidence-based policy-making,
and is itself unethical (Davies et al. 			), we can recognize that ‘evidence’
comes in a variety of forms, and make room for broad conceptions of ‘evi-
dence’ and ever-shifting social attitudes. Public attitudes and perceptions
have an important place in the policy-making process. Standing (		), for
example, sees the CCT initiative in developing countries as a political
device to legitimize cash transfers with middle-class voters and international
agencies. In the developed world, Taylor-Gooby (	) argues that welfare
reform has become politically easier and more acceptable, thanks to recent
changes in public attitudes. Analyzing the UK context, he observes hard-
ening attitudes towards welfare, thus allowing the Coalition government to
drive through radical reforms in an effort to cut public spending. Over half
of the British public now think that welfare benefits are too high, with dis-
incentive effects for work (Park et al. 	). Reciprocity may help to legiti-
mize the welfare state function according to some, but equally the shift can
be seen to undermine the principles of social policy as social solidarity. A
more mixed picture emerges across the developed world, where in the
Nordic and Southern European countries, for instance, the majority of
people appear to support the unconditional model of welfare, whereas in the
Anglo-Saxon nations it is the conditional model that is currently in favour
(Jæger 	).
The issues involved here are notoriously complex, however, and can invoke
a ‘policy sciences of tyranny’ (Dryzek ). For example, the British general
public may support elements of conditionality in welfare policy, but large
sections of the population who find themselves ‘on condition’ may object to
the policy. Nearly two-thirds of lone parents in the UK, for instance, dislike or
reject the conditions imposed upon them by the new ‘welfare-to-work’ regu-
latory regime: they would prefer to look after their own children themselves
rather than be forced into work and have to pay for child care services
(Rafferty and Wiggan 	). Hence, the evidence seems to suggest their needs
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and interests, and possibly those of their children, are not respected under the
new policy. Income management trials in Australia revealed strong support
from welfare beneficiaries (FaHCSIA 		): some 	–	 per cent of partici-
pants reported positive benefits for themselves and their families; six in ten
participants said the scheme had helped in improving the lives of their chil-
dren and just under half claimed it had done so significantly. These findings
were used by policymakers to help justify the national policy, which was rolled
out across Australia in 	. Social surveys are not always value-free instru-
ments, of course (Goerres and Prinzen 	), but even if conditionality in
policy improves levels of living for some families in ways that they approve of,
it is highly questionable whether these same families would accept or consider
appropriate the sanctions imposed when conditions are not met – particularly
if child well-being was at stake.
The policy process
Conditionality in behavioural economics is often presented as a ‘model’ to be
tested within the positivist tradition of social science. However, the implicit
assumption of a linear relationship between research evidence and policy is
not easily supported (see Parsons 		), especially where political ideology is
inextricably tied up in the policy process, as Wiggan (	) discovered. Work
by Stubbs (		) reveals how programme goals in this field are socially
constructed. Drawing on CCT experiences in Eastern Europe, Stubbs
observes how policymakers negotiate the aims and objectives of their pro-
gramme, adapting trial evidence from one context (Latin America) to another
(Europe). The historical, cultural and institutional connections here are
tenuous at best, he argues, and families may suffer as a result of the policy
translation process, as welfare is reformed. From this perspective, there is no
real ‘gold standard’ approach; judgements about evidence and policy are
required on a case-by-case basis (Cartwright 		). Often, policy conclusions
cannot simply be exported from one population or context to another.
Discussion
The world of public policy has been radically transformed in recent times, but
here we have a tale of two worlds. The great transformation of welfare within
the developed world is arguably a result of political thinking and ideology;
today the research effort is largely focused on trying to embed complex
‘workfare’ systems, in an effort to make them work more effectively. In the
global south, policy appears to be more driven by the evidence-based policy
agenda for human development. Ultimately, this seems to be about ensuring
scare funds are spent wisely to meet the MDGs, which on many levels is
unobjectionable. Strengthening the evidence-base for policy decisions is
therefore seen as a positive move. However, the whole ‘evidence-based’
approach to policy itself can be seen to be ideologically driven, as Packwood
(		) argues. In other words, CCT policies arguably support particular
beliefs and values compatible with the dominant neo-liberal paradigm –
promoted by the ‘Washington Consensus’ – that increasingly defines how
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people and society should function in the st century (Draibe and Riesco
		).
So far, governments in the developed world have largely resisted the temp-
tation to impose the sorts of behavioural conditions on welfare recipients seen
in LMICs, although this may be changing. In Australia, for example, child
benefit started to be conditioned on compliance with national healthcare
requirements, while the new income management programme goes much
further with behavioural conditioning. In the UK, the government is consid-
ering stronger ‘workfare’ measures for the long-term unemployed, who
otherwise risk losing all their benefits. Social policy, it would seem, is
becoming increasingly interventionist, and conditioned (e.g. Thaler and
Sunsyein 		; Behavioural Insights Team 	). Governments are turning to
behavioural economics and ‘libertarian paternalism’ to tackle complex ‘social
problems’, often resulting from current lifestyles of apparent ‘excess’ (Le
Grand 		; HM Government 		). In so doing, new systems of governance
for monitoring and controlling our behaviour, designed to enhance social
justice and human well-being, are firmly established, as the behavioural
psychologist B. F. Skinner famously anticipated (Skinner ).
So what lessons might we draw from this review? A basic question within
social policy, which is rarely addressed directly or well (the work by Saunders
		, is exceptional in this regard), is to ask whether the ends of welfare justify
their means. This review offers three different, and partly conflicting, answers
to this question:
• The ends justify the means. There is no shortage of good solid evidence
from robust evaluations and systematic-reviews in LMICs that show sig-
nificant benefits and great strides in social progress and human flourishing
(e.g. tables –). Developed countries could learn much from social experi-
mentation with social policies that include robust evaluations.
• The ends do not justify the means. The behavioural approach to tackling
global social problems such as chronic poverty is failing (e.g. figure 
).
Evaluations are often flimsy and evidence is overstated. At best, we find
marginal gains for untold costs (e.g. tables –).
• Maybe the ends justify the means. However, there is much uncertainty,
results are often inclusive or conflicting and there are plenty of ‘infor-
mation gaps’. We simply do not know at present whether the ends justify
the means. The lack of cost-benefit data and trials of alternative models
(e.g. unconditional transfers) are major impediments in this field.
All three positions carry great weight in the social and policy sciences at
present. Ultimately, then, the ‘use’ and ‘misuse’ of evidence and evaluation
appear to lie in the eye of the beholder. Those advocating neo-liberal forms of
policy, particularly with conditionality applied to social security or assistance,
argue the ‘use’ of evidence and evaluation can be justified both in principle
and practice. Those who argue for ‘misuse’ flatly reject this. The issues
discussed here cannot easily be solved by appeals to the ‘evidence’ alone, at
least how things stand, and while better evaluations may help, they are sure to
stir and provoke our values and principles still further.
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Notes
. To be included in a systematic review or meta-analysis, a study must usually meet
strict research quality criteria relating to research design, often this usually means
a randomization or a well designed before-and-after control study. A clear measure
of at least one outcome is also required.
. The International Development Coordinating Group website of the Campbell
Collaboration has further information on systematic reviews completed and
in-progress, http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/international_development/
index.php (accessed  March 	).
. This study published in  appears to be the first RCT in the field of social
security in Britain.
. A statistical model, underpinned by mathematical equations, is a formalization of
relationships between variables. The model is statistical as the variables are not
deterministically related but stochastically (best fit) related.
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